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CONSTRAINED INEFFICIENCY IN GEI: A GEOMETRIC
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MARIO TIRELLI
Abstract. In this paper we use global analysis to study the welfare properties
of general equilibrium economies with incomplete markets (GEI). Our main
result is to show that constrained Pareto optimal equilibria are contained in a
linear submanifold of the equilibrium set. This result is explicitly derived for
economies with real assets, of which real num´ eraire assets are a special case.
1. Introduction
Since Radner (1972) there has been a large body of literature studying gen-
eral equilibrium economies with incomplete markets (GEI). The analysis pioneered
by Arrow (1951) and Debreu (1960) on economies with uncertainty and complete
markets has been extended in this new direction with contributions addressing tra-
ditional issues, such as existence and eﬃciency of equilibria (see Geanakoplos (1990)
and Magill and Shafer (1991) for up to date surveys).
In GEI equilibria are typically not Pareto optimal. Moreover, this result per-
sists also under weaker notions of eﬃciency. Although, the literature has proposed
diﬀerent notions of constrained Pareto optimality (CPO), economists often refer
to Diamond’s (1967), Stiglitz’s (1982), and Geanakoplos - Polemarchakis’s (1986),
as the benchmark. This notion is based on the idea that, when implementing an
allocation, a central planner faces the same ﬁnancial constraints of the private sec-
tor. In a pure exchange economy with multiple goods, this notion requires that
the planner’s attainable set contains allocations which are a) resource-feasible, b)
achievable through portfolio transfers of the existing assets.
Stiglitz (1982) was the ﬁrst to provide an argument for constrained ineﬃciency
in GEI, with multiple commodities. The intuition behind Stiglitz’s result runs as
follows. A portfolio change does typically determine a change in spot prices and
consumption allocations. Since markets are incomplete, and consumers’ marginal
rates of substitution are -in general- diﬀerent, a change in spot prices may induce
pecuniary externalities, which are not anticipated by price taking agents. A central
planner that takes into account these externalities has an advantage that can be
exploited in improving the market allocation of risk.
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Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986), and later Geanakoplos et al (1990), gen-
eralized Stiglitz’s result, respectively, in the context of pure exchange and produc-
tion GEI. Precisely, they derived conditions to prove generic constrained subop-
timality of equilibria. The argument used in these classical contributions, and in
other papers that followed is to show that -under certain conditions- an equilibrium
can be locally Pareto improved. Indeed, they proved that an equilibrium fails to
be constrained eﬃcient when it does not satisfy the ﬁrst order conditions for CPO.
Then, they show that this result is “robust”, by establishing that it holds for a
generic set of economies.1
In this paper we propose a diﬀerent approach to the analysis of the welfare
properties of equilibria, based on the global analysis of the equilibrium set. Our
main result is to show that CPO equilibria are contained in a linear submanifold
of the equilibrium set.
Surprisingly, very little attention has been given to the global properties of equi-
libria in GEI. Balasko and Cass (1989), and later Siconolﬁ and Villanacci (1991),
were the ﬁrst to provide a global characterization of equilibria in GEI, respectively,
with variable and ﬁxed resources. Their goal however was to use these character-
izations to analyze the indeterminacy of equilibria. It was only with Zhou (1997)
that welfare analysis entered into the picture, with the characterization of the set
of Pareto optimal (ﬁrst best) equilibria.
To pursue our goal, in section 2 of the paper, we go back to the description
and deﬁnition of the notion of CPO, and present the underlined planner’s prob-
lem. We analyze this problem and characterize its ﬁrst order conditions. Then,
we also discuss some relevant, generic, properties of equilibria. For expositional
purposes, section 2 refers to the case of economies with real num´ eraire assets that
was extensively considered in the literature.
In section 3, we use our knowledge of the planner’s problem to derive the
structure of the set of CPO equilibria. This result is derived in steps. We ﬁrst
show that the equilibrium set has a ﬁber bundle structure. The choice of the
parametrization is original, and it is driven by our ultimate goal. Yet, it turns out
that the structure of the bundle shares most of the properties presented for the
equilibrium set of a standard Walrasian economy in Balasko (1988); namely, every
ﬁber is a linear submanifold of the equilibrium set, and it is uniquely identiﬁed
by a no-trade equilibrium. Our ﬁnal step is to show that CPO equilibria are
contained in the ﬁbers; and precisely that each ﬁber contains, at most, one CPO
equilibrium. The bundle structure, and in particular the lower dimensionality of the
set of CPO equilibria, can be exploited to establish (generic) constrained ineﬃciency
of equilibria. We complete our analysis for economies with real assets, of which real
num´ eraire assets are a special case. Extensions to nominal assets, and to mixed
asset structures are straightforward.
Our geometric approach to constrained suboptimality is substantially diﬀerent
from the one that is used in the literature, and resumed in section 2 of the paper. It
does not rely on the characteristics of the parameter space, but directly on equilib-
ria. Moreover, it establishes constrained suboptimality without having to impose
any speciﬁc measure theoretical structure; just using dimensionality arguments.
Obviously, the two concepts, dimensionality and measure, can be linked.
1See, for example, Magill and Shafer (1991), for a discussion on this approach.CONSTRAINED INEFFICIENCY IN GEI: A GEOMETRIC ARGUMENT 3
2. Constrained Pareto optimality and equilibria
In this section we provide a notion of constrained Pareto optimality (CPO) and
equilibrium. For expositional reasons, we do so in the context of a standard GEI
with real num´ eraire assets.
2.1. Economy and equilibria.
Economy. The economy is of pure exchange over two periods, with uncertainty,
and ﬁnitely many individuals and commodities. There are two dates indexed by
0 and 1. Uncertainty is described by a ﬁnite number S ≥ 2 of possible states
of nature in date 1. Including date 0 as one of the states, we use the indexing
s = 0,1,..,S, and deﬁne N = (S + 1). There are a ﬁnite number H ≥ 2 of consumer
types, indexed by h = 1,..,H. In each state, L ≥ 2 commodities are available





+, where m = NL. We allow for economies with ﬁxed aggregate
resources, ω ∈ Rm
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When ωs = ω for all s, the economy has no-aggregate uncertainty. Finally, in date
0, there are also J ≥ 1 ﬁnancial assets available for trade. Assets are in zero net
supply.
Each consumer, h, is initially endowed of a (column) vector eh = (..,eh
sl,..)0 ∈
Rm
+ of commodities. His preferences are represented by an ordinal utility function
uh : Rm
++ → R. Finally, some assumptions on endowments and preferences are
summarized in the following, and will be maintained throughout the paper.
Assumption 1. (strictly positive endowments): eh ∈ Rm
++
Assumption 2. (smooth preferences):2 ∀h, uh is Cr≥2, strictly increasing, (Duh(x) ∈
Rm
++, ∀x ∈ Rm
+), strictly concave, (bD2uh(x)b0 < 0, ∀x ∈ RN
++,∀b ∈ Rm, b 6= 0,
such that Duh(x)b0 = 0); indiﬀerence surfaces are bounded below (∀x∗ ∈ Rm
++, 
x ∈ Rm




For simplicity, in most of the analysis we will also use the following assumption.





With an abuse of notation, we denote the set of utilities which satisfy assump-
tions 2 and 3, U; ﬁnally, we let U = ×hU.
Markets. Commodities and assets are, respectively, traded in spot and asset mar-
kets. Spot prices are a vector P = (..,Psl,..) ∈ Rm
+, and P1 ∈ RSL
+ denotes its date
1 component. Commodity l = 1 is the num´ eraire, and its price is normalized to
one: Ps1 = 1, for all s.
Assets are real num´ eraire. Each asset j is exchanged in date 0 (before uncertainty
is resolved) at a price qj, q = (..,qj,..) ∈ RJ. Asset j is a claim for a contingent
payoﬀ Rj = (..,Rj
s,..)0 ∈ RS
+ expressed in units of the num´ eraire. R is the S × J




∈ Rm, where Dxs,luh(xh) =
∂uh(xh)/∂xh
s,l. Moreover, we use X to indicate the closure of a set X.4 MARIO TIRELLI
payoﬀ matrix. W (q,R) is the N × J asset matrix, composed by −q in the ﬁrst
row and Rs = (..,Rj
s,..) ∈ RJ
+ in each of the s = 1,..,S subsequent rows. Asset
markets are incomplete, J < S.
Competitive trade and equilibria. Let us ﬁx (u,R,ω) and denote an economy
simply by an endowment distribution e in Ω(ω). At prices (P,q), the budget set of






= W (q,R)θ, θ ∈ RJ	
where θ = (..,θj,..)0 ∈ RJ denotes a portfolio of assets. The action of h is, respec-
tively, represented by the demand functions for commodities and assets,
xh(P,q,eh) =














and spot trades are deﬁned by zh(P,q,eh) = xh(P,q,eh)−eh. First order, necessary
and suﬃcient, conditions imply that q = λhR, λhP = ∇uh(xh).4






Deﬁnition 1. (Equilibria with real num´ eraire assets) For ﬁxed (u,R,ω), an equi-












Denote by ER the set of equilibria with real num´ eraire assets with ﬁxed (u,R,ω).
It is well known that ER has a smooth manifold structure.5 Therefore, there exists
a generic set of endowments such that equilibria are locally isolated and equilibrium
variables do locally behave as smooth functions of the parameters.
2.2. Constrained Pareto Optimality. Although the literature has proposed dif-
ferent notions of Constrained Pareto Optimality (CPO) in GEI, economists often
refer to Diamond’s (1967), Stiglitz’s (1982), and Geanakoplos - Polemarchakis’s
(1986), as the benchmark.6 This criterion is based on the idea that, when im-
plementing a centralized allocation, a ﬁctitious planner faces the same ﬁnancial
constraints of the private sector. In a pure exchange economy with multiple goods,
this notion implies that the planner’s attainable set contains allocations which are
a) resource-feasible, b) achievable through portfolio transfers in the existing assets.
Note that, since transfers occur in the ﬁrst period, the attainable set of consumption
allocation depends on prices. More precisely, assume that L ≥ 2, and that central-
ized portfolio transfers are decided in date 0, after markets have closed. Then, the
ﬁnal centralized, feasible, allocation will still depend on the possible trading activ-
ity taking place on date 1 spot-markets, and thus on P1.7 Equivalently, a resource
3For any two vectors x ∈ RS, y ∈ RSL, we deﬁne xy = (....,xs (ys1,..ysl,..,ysL),...) ∈ RSL.
4∇uh(x) = (..,∇sluh(x),..) is consumer h normalized gradient at x, and ∇sluh(x) =
Dxsluh (x)/Dxs1uh (x).
5See Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986), section 6.
6See Magill and Shafer (1991), chapter 5, for a discussion of this subject.
7A second notion, known as weak constrained eﬃciency, requires that prices must support the
centralized allocation as a GEI equilibrium. This is equivalent to assume that the central planner
intervenes when all markets are open. See Grossman (1977), and Grossman and Hart (1979).CONSTRAINED INEFFICIENCY IN GEI: A GEOMETRIC ARGUMENT 5
feasible allocation, x = (x0,x1), is attainable if there exist portfolio transfers θ
such that xs can be supported as a spot market equilibrium (Ps,xs) of an economy
e es = es + Rsθ, for s = 1,..,S; where the following deﬁnition applies.
Deﬁnition 2. (Spot-market equilibrium) (Ps,xs) is a spot-market equilibrium in
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s − e eh
s) = 0.
A spot-market equilibrium in date 1 is a spot-market equilibrium in s, for s = 1,..,S.
Let e e1 = e1+ e Rθ, where e R = (e R1,.., e RS) is a SL×J matrix whose typical column
vector e Rs is such that e R
j
sl = Rj
s for l = 1, and 0 otherwise. A formal deﬁnition of
the planner’s constrained feasible set is,
Deﬁnition 3. (Constrained feasible consumption allocation - CF) A consumption
allocation x = (x0,x1) is constrained feasible (CF) at (x0,e,R) if there exists a θ
and a P1 such that (P1,x1) is a spot-market equilibrium in date 1, at e e1 = e1+ e Rθ.
A set of consumption allocations is said to be CF with transfers if it contains all
those CF allocations which are attainable through date 0 transfers in the num´ eraire
commodity.
First, note that a competitive equilibrium is a spot market equilibrium. Let
(P,q,e), with P = (P0,P1), be a real num´ eraire equilibrium with allocation, (x,θ),
for the economy (e,R). Then, (P1,x1) is a date 1 spot-market equilibrium at
e e1 = e1 + e Rθ. Therefore, real num´ eraire equilibria are CF.
Moreover, since the planner’s set of instruments is represented by portfolio trans-
fers, at current market prices, these transfers and their corresponding consumption
allocations are also attainable for the individual consumers.
Deﬁnition 4. (Constrained eﬃcient allocation - CPO) A consumption allocation
is a CPO (with transfers) if it is not Pareto dominated by any other allocation that
is CF (with transfers).8
Before trying to explicitly write down the planner’s problem capturing the deﬁ-
nition of CPO, observe that the set of CPO is nonempty. Indeed, if R is a ﬁxed real
num´ eraire payoﬀ matrix of full rank, the CF set is clearly nonempty and compact;
hence a CPO is a PO restricted on the CF set.9
The planner problem is deﬁned as follows. x = (x0,x1) is CPO at (x0,e,R), if















8A modiﬁcation to our notions of constrained feasibility and optimality would be to consider
the case in which, after each policy intervention, only the asset markets close. In this case, true
consumers would not be able to re-trade assets, but they would typically trade commodities on
date 0 spots. Obviously, this becomes relevant in economies in which agents consume also in
period 0, as for example in Magill and Shafer (1991). Then, we would say that x = (x0,x1) is
constrained feasible at (q,e,R) if and only if there exists a θ and a P = (P0,P1) such that (P,x)
is a spot-market equilibrium in both dates, at (e e0,e e1) =

e0 − qθ,e1 + e Rθ

. Since modifying
our notion of constrained eﬃciency in the latter sense does not qualitatively aﬀect the rest of the
analysis, we shall hereafter refer to our deﬁnition 3.
9This set coincides with the set A described for the same purposes in Werner (1991).6 MARIO TIRELLI
where vh (·) and δh, respectively, denote the indirect utility function and the welfare
weight of h; while P1 is the price functional of a date 1 spot-equilibrium.10
It follows from the previous discussion that the central planner problem (2.2)
has a solution.
Next, suppose that the spot price functional, P1, is diﬀerentiable. A CPO allo-























= 0,∀h ≥ 2, ∀j.
where the ﬁrst term on the left hand side is the aggregate income eﬀect, and the
second is the aggregate, relative price, eﬀect.
Let b λh = ∂v
h
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sl = 0 for all s and all l 6= 1.
Following Stiglitz (1982) one can test for the CPO of an equilibrium allocation
by checking if the conditions in (2.3) hold. To ensure that the spot price functional,
P1, is diﬀerentiable, we restrict the attention to the subset of economies, denoted
by Ω0, such that, for every (e0,e1) in Ω0, and every vector of transfers, θ, the
spot-market economies e e1 = e1 + e Rθ are regular: P1(e e1) is (at least) one time
diﬀerentiable.
Then, consider an equilibrium (P,q,e), of an economy e in Ω0, and allocations
(x,θ). Let δh = 1/λh




Rj = 0 for all h,j. The necessary conditions









where DθP1 = (...,Dθh













s + Rsθh. Where by a price-income equilibrium, for spot s (with
aggregate resources ωs) we mean a pair (Ps,xs) such that xh




for all h, and
P
h xh
s − ωs = 0.
11Consider the representation of a Planner problem in which δh is the Lagrange multipliers
associated to the constraint, vh
1 (P,m) ≥ vh
1, and take vh
1 to be the utility level achieved at date 1,
in a competitive equilibrium. Then, letting δh = 1/λh
0 is equivalent to say that there exist welfare
weights such that the original equilibrium satisﬁes CPO necessary conditions; this is the usual
I welfare theorem. If, instead, we ﬁx welfare weights, and we ask if an allocation that satisﬁes
necessary conditions for CPO can be achieved at equilibrium, then we need to introduce date 0,
transfers. The latter is the perspective of the II welfare theorem.CONSTRAINED INEFFICIENCY IN GEI: A GEOMETRIC ARGUMENT 7
Observe that (2.4) can be interpreted by saying that a CPO equilibrium is such
that there do not exist, feasible, portfolios redistributions that can induce indirect
welfare eﬀects; with “indirect eﬀects” meaning eﬀects propagating through changes
in relative spot prices (i.e. “pecuniary externalities”).
Remark 1. (Assets redistribution, trade, and markets) It is now easy to see why
in the notion of CPO it is important that centralized assets redistributions occur





allocations (x,θ). If we let agents trade in assets after a planner’s (marginal)
portfolios redistribution, dθ, they would want to return to their original portfolios
holdings, θ. In fact, ‘expecting’ prices to retain their initial value, their choice (x,θ)





equivalent to say that, with ex-post re-trade of assets, for the economy e, the only CF
allocation x at (x0,e,R) is such that (P1,x1) is a no-trade spot-market equilibrium
in date 1 at e e1 = x1 = e1+ e Rθ. Clearly, in this case portfolio redistributions cannot
have any welfare eﬀects.
2.2.1. Some suﬃcient conditions for (2.4) to hold. A few, well known, suf-
ﬁcient conditions for (2.4) can be invoked.12
(1) Identical, individual, state-prices: λh − λ1 = 0 for all h.
(2) No trade: zh = 0 for all but one h.
(3) Policy interventions have no price eﬀects: DθP1 = 0.




sl = 0 for all s, all
l 6= 1. Let us consider (3). Restricting to economies in Ω0,
DθP1 = −(DPZ1(P,m))−1DθZ1(P,m)
Therefore (3) occurs if and only if DθZ1(P,m) = 0. Indeed, the latter holds
if, at least locally (in a small neighborhood of the spot-equilibrium), preferences
have identical Gorman forms; i.e. agents have identical marginal propensities to










s, asl (P) ≡
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∂vs(P)/∂Psl

























= (a1l (P) − a1l(P),...,aSl(P) − aSl(P))Rj = 0
In the next subsection we will argue that none of the above conditions, (1)
through (3), is generic.
2.3. Generic properties of equilibria. Property (1) does not typically hold in
an equilibrium of a GEI economy. Instead, properties (2) and (3) are non-generic for
competitive economies regardless their markets are complete or incomplete. More
precisely, for (1) and (2), the following result is well known, and will not be proved
here.13
12By assumption, we are ruling out economies with L = 1. This implying no relative price
eﬀects.
13At the individual optimum, the consumer gradient belongs to the subspace orthogonal to
the one spanned by the columns of W, i.e. to a (N − J) > 1 dimensional space. Thus, generically,8 MARIO TIRELLI
Lemma 1. There exists a generic set of economies, Ω∗, such that for every e in
Ω∗ and every (P,q,e) in ER, properties (1) and (2) do not hold.
We devote a little more discussion to show why (3) is also non-generic.
Let us consider an economy e in Ω0 (with preferences and payoﬀ structure (u,R)).
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P,q,eh
. Then, clearly, for every
real num´ eraire equilibrium,
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P,q,eh
, with ms = ms (P,q,e), (Ps,ms) is a (price-
























Next, it is well known that the Slutzky matrix is the inverse of the Jacobian of
the individual demand system. Since here we are concerned with a spot-market



















where for spot s, S is the matrix of substitution eﬀects, and κ0 is the matrix of the
individual propensity to consume, Dmh
















s is evaluated at xh




































In the next lemma we will parametrize a price-income, spot-market, economy
also with respect to preferences, and deﬁne individual demands correspondingly.
Lemma 2. Let (P1,m1) be such that Dmh
s e xh
s are well deﬁned. There exists an open
and dense set of utility functions, U∗ ⊂ U, such that at their individual optimum,






for all (h,s) ≥ (2,1).
Proof: see the Appendix.
To prove the latter lemma, we restrict the attention to a class of utilities ad-
mitting (local) quadratic perturbations. As it can be inferred by looking at (2.6),
this type of perturbations have the nice property that they can be rationalized as
perturbations of the Slutzky matrix,14 which do not aﬀect individual ﬁrst order
conditions, and allocations.15
N −J, state prices are distinct. This is shown, for example in Magill and Shafer (1991), Theorem
10, and it is used to argue that equilibria are typically not Pareto optimal.
Finally, no-trade can be ruled out perturbing the individual endowments on the asset span.
This type of perturbations will also be illustrated later in this section of the paper.
14See Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1980).
15This is important also because, in our context, the initial equilibrium values are real
num´ eraire spot prices P1, consumption allocations x1, and hence state prices.CONSTRAINED INEFFICIENCY IN GEI: A GEOMETRIC ARGUMENT 9
Having in mind equation (2.5), we are now ready to deﬁne the (generic) space
of economies in which, at equilibrium, property (3) does not hold, (i.e. DθPs 6= 0).
This clearly extends to the case of S (L − 1) spots. Exploiting state-separability








∈ RS(L−1)×1. Therefore, DθZ1(P,m) =
(...,Dθh




[Dmhe xh] − [Dm1e x1]

Rj
By the last lemma, generically, Dθh
j Z1 6= 0. Therefore, since a real num´ eraire
equilibrium in Ω0 is a spot market equilibrium, we can state the following.
Corollary 1. For every economy (e,u) ∈ Ω0×U∗, real num´ eraire equilibria satisfy,
DθP1 6= 0
Next, going back to the planner problem, we observe that condition (2.4) is








j P1 = 0 for all (h,j) ≥
(2,1), where Dθh
j P1 = −(DPZ1)−1Dθh
j Z1 is also evaluated at equilibrium. The
following result is central to establish constrained ineﬃciency.
Lemma 3. There exists a generic set of economies Ω∗ ⊂ Ω0 such that for every










j P1 6= 0,
for some h,j.
Proof: see the Appendix.
The proof of the latter lemma relays on standard perturbations of the endow-











0, for all h,j. Then, perturb the endowments of some h and of 1 as to keep the
value of transfers of h, P1zh
1, on the asset span, and satisfy market clearing. This
will not modify any of the equilibrium variables; yet, by changing (zh
1,z1
1) these












2.4. Constrained ineﬃciency of equilibria. Just to summarize, consider a reg-
ular equilibrium, and a planner’s redistribution of portfolios. Since this occurs at
date zero, when asset markets have closed, agents are prevented from re-trading
assets; still portfolio changes have modiﬁed their date 1- income distribution. Thus,
at the new income distribution, agents may want to modify their consumption allo-
cations. Precisely, if their marginal propensities to consume are diﬀerent, this will
occur in such a way as to modify relative spot prices. Because markets are incom-
plete, and marginal rates of substitutions are typically diﬀerent across agents, the
former may produce an aggregate welfare gain. Date 0 transfers, if feasible, can be
used by the planner to redistribute such gain so as to achieve a Pareto improvement.
More precisely, applying lemma 3, we have:
Theorem 1. (Constrained ineﬃciency of real num´ eraire equilibria) For every (e,u)




, are not CPO with transfers.10 MARIO TIRELLI
The reason why date 0 transfers are needed is linked with the usual instrument-
objective requirement. In absence of transfers, the planner can at most control
S (L − 1) instruments, the relative price changes, attained by portfolios redistri-
butions, to achieve a Pareto improvement over H consumers. This is possible if
H ≤ S (L − 1).16
2.4.1. Constrained ineﬃciency with a “large” number of types. When the
economy is characterized by a suﬃciently large number of consumer types, H >
S (L − 1), the arguments used above, in lemma 2 leads to establish that, generically
in utility space, DθP1 has full row rank, S (L − 1), at an individual optimum.17 This
implies that P1 is a surjective function of θ (by e e), and thus that the planner can
eﬀectively control relative spot-prices through portfolios. This is a clear advantage
the planner has on price-taking consumers.



























1l) = 0, all l ≥ 2
the terms in parenthesis, on the left hand side, refer to the multipliers attached to
the corresponding constraints.










Clearly, with “large” economies, (2.10) should replace (2.4) in our whole analysis.
3. The structure of equilibria and their welfare properties
As we have mentioned in the introduction, the GEI literature poses no attention
to the analysis of the structure of CPO equilibria. This is an interesting prob-
lem since it allows to look at constrained ineﬃciency from a diﬀerent angle. In
particular, in this section we show that CPO equilibria are “exceptional”; namely,
Theorem 2. There exist a generic set of economies in Ω(ω)×U, such that CPO -
equilibria are contained in a linear, lower dimensional, submanifold of the equilib-
rium set.
To prove our theorem, we ﬁrst derive a global parametrization of the equilibrium
set. This parametrization is used to characterize equilibria as a ﬁber bundle. Such
a characterization is simple and shares most of the properties of the one proposed
for Walrasian equilibria in Balasko (1988):
• every ﬁber is contained in the equilibrium set;
• every ﬁber is a linear submanifold of the equilibrium set;
• every ﬁber contains only one (and is therefore identiﬁed by a) no-trade
equilibrium;
• each equilibrium belongs to one ﬁber only.
16See the remark on p. 1594 of Magill and Shafer (1991).
17The idea is again that one can show that it is possible to locally, and independently, control
DθhZ for as many as S (L − 1) consumers h, using quadratic perturbations of utilities.CONSTRAINED INEFFICIENCY IN GEI: A GEOMETRIC ARGUMENT 11
Moreover, if one looks at the case in which there are as many assets as the
number of states, this characterization reproduces Balasko’s. Finally, we show that
• each ﬁber contains, at most, one CPO equilibrium.
In Walrasian economies, no-trade equilibria are Pareto optima (PO), i.e. the I
Welfare Theorem applies. Therefore, no-trade Walrasian equilibria can be simply
recovered using the solutions of a PO problem; the parametrization of the set of PO
is indeed a global parametrization of the set of no-trade Walrasian equilibria. In ex-
tending this logic to economies with incomplete markets, we run into two obstacles.
First, no-trade GEI are, typically, not PO. Second, CPO equilibria, generically,
entail some trade across agents (i.e. they do not belong to the no-trade equilibrium
set). We outrode the ﬁrst obstacle by showing that no-trade equilibria can actually











at “welfare weights” χ = (1,.,χh
s,..) ∈ RH(S+1), with Ω denoting the closure of
Ω(ω). Diﬀerently from Pareto optima, in this problem welfare weights are state-
contingent. Moreover, we will show that if one is concerned with a GEI with
(S − J) degrees of market incompleteness, χ has to be constrained to live in a
(H − 1) + (H − 1)(S − J)- dimensional set. If markets are complete, and J = S,
this parametrization is the one used for Walrasian no-trade equilibria. However as
J decreases, falling below S, the dimensionality of the parameter space increases.
In the limit -when J = 0- the dimension of the parametrization is the one corre-
sponding to the equilibrium set of a (S + 1)− spot-market economy, in which each
spot is indeed an isolated Walrasian economy.
Once the set of no-trade GEI, Tω,R, has been parametrized, the global structure
of equilibria is easily derived. For every no-trade equilibrium, with prices and
allocations (P,q,x,θ), one can identify the set of equilibria (P,q,e) with active
trade. This boils down to considering the set of economies parametrized by initial
endowments, e, such that, at (P,q,e), (x,θ) are feasible and satisfy market clearing.
This set has dimension n = (H−1)(m−(S−J +1)). Therefore, for ﬁxed aggregate
resources and asset structure, (ω,R), one ﬁnds that18
Eω,R ∼ = Tω,R × Rn
++ ∼ = Ω(ω)
Next, we still have to overcome the second obstacle. Even though, as we claimed,
CPO equilibria do typically entail some trade, trading opportunities are limited:
on top of constraining endowments to satisfy budget balance and market clearing,









where, P1,x1 are no-trade equilibrium prices and allocations, and λ are the corre-
sponding individual, marginal rates of substitutions. Thus, if we put ourselves on
a ﬁber of the equilibrium set, identiﬁed by a no-trade equilibrium, and we move
along such ﬁber, we might hit the unique CPO allocation associated to it. The
possibility that some ﬁbers do not contain CPO equilibria is implied by the fact
18∼ = denotes equivalence up to an homeomorphism.12 MARIO TIRELLI
that (2.4) are only necessary conditions. However, since the CPO problem admits
solutions, CPO equilibria exist on some ﬁbers.
Notice that our informal discussion is provided for a given real num´ eraire payoﬀ
matrix, R, of full rank J. Since each of such matrices identiﬁes an asset span, L
in GJ,S, the same discussion would go through if we had directly parametrized the
economy on GJ,S (as in Duﬃe and Shafer (1985)). Indeed this is exactly what we
do in the rest of paper. Although at some cost, our choice turns out to be partic-
ularly useful when it comes to deal with the more general case of real-num´ eraire
assets, or with nominal assets, for which the asset span is deﬁned endogenously,
at equilibrium. The additional cost of parametrizing with respect to L is that the
equilibrium set retains its vector space structure only locally (on GJ,S).
3.1. Deﬁnitions. For ﬁxed preferences, u, and aggregate resources, ω, an economy
with an “abstract” ﬁnancial market structure, L, is a pair (e,L) ∈ RmH
++ × GJ,S.
GJ,S is the Grassmanian of J−planes in RS.
Without loss of generality,19 assume that the ﬁrst individual is ﬁnancially un-






























for all h ≥ 2.
We normalize prices by taking p01 = 1, and denote the set of normalized prices,
P ⊂ R
(S+1)L−1
++ . The truncated aggregate excess demand function is






Then, the following sets of equilibria are deﬁned.
SJ =






(p,L,e) ∈ SJ : g1(p,pe1) = e1, fh(p,L,eh) = eh,∀h ≥ 2
	
.
Observe that SJ is the set of equilibria deﬁned for all possible asset span L in GJ,S.
TJ is the subset of SJ for which there is no trade.
3.2. The structure of equilibria. To derive the structure of the equilibrium
set we will appeal to Lemma 3.2.1 in Balasko (1988), limiting our proofs to the
deﬁnition of the required diﬀeomorphisms:
Lemma 4. (Lemma 3.2.1 in Balasko (1988)) Let τ : X → Y , and φ : Y → X, be
two smooth mappings between smooth manifolds such that the composition τ ◦ φ :
Y → Y is the identity mapping. Then, the set Z = φ(Y ) is a smooth submanifold
of X diﬀeomorphic to Y .
The deﬁnition of a parametrization, Y , is the preliminary, essential, step we will
take in the next subsection.
19See remark 3 below.CONSTRAINED INEFFICIENCY IN GEI: A GEOMETRIC ARGUMENT 13
3.2.1. Parametrization. The parametrization we are going to introduce hinges










is a function of µh ∈ RS. Let µ denote the (H − 1) × S - matrix of typical row
µh. Further, deﬁne MJ the set of matrices µ of rank c = S − J (its closure, MJ,
contains matrices of rank c ≤ S − J).
The parameter set MJ summarizes all the ‘relevant’ information concerning asset
markets and individual state-prices. Indeed, if markets are complete (S = J), then
the rank of µ is zero, therefore µ = 0, and dimMS = 0: consumers’ evaluations
(marginal rates of substitutions) are all equal to p. At the other extreme, if there are
no assets (J = 0), dimM0 = (H −1)S. Thus, if (H −1) > S, consumer evaluations
may span RS (i.e. there is “maximal disagreement” among consumers).
The next two lemmas summarize all the key properties of MJ.
Lemma 5. MJ as the set of (H − 1)×S matrices of rank (S − J) is a submanifold
of R(H−1)S of dimension, dimMJ = c∗ = (H − 1 + J)(S − J), and codimension,
c◦ = ((H − 1) − (S − J))J.
Proof: see the Appendix.
Next, we argue that each element of MJ identiﬁes an asset span, L in GJ,S. Take









deﬁnes a basis for
L⊥, and thus uniquely identiﬁes L. Precisely, we can deﬁne a projective mapping,
αJ, from MJ to GJ,S, by taking αJ = ψ(µ
−1
/J µJ); where ψ is an homeomorphism21 of
GJ,S onto RJ(S−J) that identiﬁes the unique (S−J)J−coordinate system of L. This
implies that there exists a, nontrivial, ((H − 1) − (S − J)) × (S − J)−matrix Q
such that (µ/J | µJ) = Q(IS−J | ψ(L)). Clearly, Q = µ/Jµ
−1
/J , and µJ = µ/Jµ
−1
/J µJ,
as it is shown in the proof of lemma 5.
Next, it is easily seen that diﬀerent elements of MJ can identify the same asset
span. We say that µ,µ0 are in the same equivalence class (∼), µ ∼ µ0, if and only if
they generate the same basis for a (S − J) dimensional space. Hereafter, we refer
to MJ as the (quotient) topological space, MJ/ ∼.22,23
A ﬁnal step is to establish the global structure of MJ as a ﬁber bundle over
GJ,S. This is done by regarding MJ as the total, topological, space, GJ,S as the
base space, and αJ as the projective map. Deﬁne the canonical vector bundle
20This is always possible because µ in MJ is of rank S − J; therefore, we can permuting the
rows of µ such that (µ/J | µJ) is a basis for a (S − J) dimensional space, and µ/J is nonsingular.
21An homeomorphism is a bijective, continuous, mapping whose inverse is also continuous.
22This procedure uses the quotient topology on the Grassmanian to deﬁne a topology for MJ.
The next lemma helps to clarify this point.
23Take the closure of M0, M0. If µ ∈ M0, consumer evaluations span a vector space of at most
dimension S. More generally, MS ⊂ .. ⊂ MJ ⊂ .. ⊂ M0, and ∪S
k=JMk is an open cover of MJ, for
all J = 0,..,S. The ﬁnite covering property of MJ is important since it implies compactness.14 MARIO TIRELLI
over GJ,S, υ =

L,y ∈ GJ,S × RS : y ∈ L
	
, and its orthogonal complement, υ⊥ = 
L,y ∈ GJ,S × RS : y⊥L
	
; then the following holds,
Lemma 6. MJ is a vector bundle over GJ,S, MJ ∼ = (H − 1)υ⊥.24 Its projective
map, αJ, identiﬁes a unique L for each µ in MJ.
Proof: see the Appendix.
3.2.2. The structure of no-trade equilibria.
Proposition 1. TJ, is a manifold diﬀeomorphic to R
H−1
++ × MJ. Moreover, as a
ﬁber bundle over GJ,S, TJ ∼ = εH−1 ⊕ (H − 1)υ⊥.25
Again, the proof of this proposition uses lemma 4, and it is deferred to the
Appendix. To apply this lemma, we let Y = R
H−1
++ × MJ, and X = SJ. For the
time being, we will assume that SJ is a smooth manifold; this is established in
















































with “welfare weights” χ1
s = 1 for all s, χh
0 = δh, χh
s = δh(1+µh
s) for all s ≥ 1, and
all h ≥ 2; Ω is the closure of Ω(ω).
Remark 2. (The structure of TJ) When J ∈ {0,S} the set of no-trade equilibria
has a (globally) trivial (vector space) structure. Using TS to denote the no-trade
complete markets version of TJ, it is easy to see that, TS ∼ = ∆H−1.27 This is the case
in which µ = 0, and consumer gradients are collinear. On the other extreme, when
asset markets are totally incomplete, we have T0 ∼ = ×s∆H−1. In all intermediate
cases, 0 < J < S, TJ ∼ = TS ⊕(H −1)υ⊥; namely TJ retains a vector space structure
only locally on GJ,S.
24A ﬁber bundle with vector space structure on ﬁbers is a vector bundle.
∼ = denotes an homeomorphism relationship.
25εn
B denotes the trivial vector bundle (B × Rn,B,α); a ﬁber bundle that has a global (as
suppose to local) vector space structure. We drop the base space, B, from this notation, since
this clearly emerges from the context.
⊕ denotes the Whitney sum. This operates as a direct sum across the elements of the ﬁbers
of a vector bundle.





i yi = 1
o
.
27See Balasko (1988), section 3.3 for details on the structure of no-trade equilibria when mar-
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3.2.3. The structure of equilibria with active trade. Next, consider equilibria
in which consumers trade an initial set of resources (or endowments). The new
parameter space will then be enlarged by the dimensionality of the space of relevant
spot trade opportunities.
For ﬁxed aggregate resources ω, deﬁne b Ω ⊂ Rn
++ the section of Ωσ ⊂ Ω(ω) of





b e ∈ Rn :
b e = (b e0,b e1)
b eh
0 = (eh













Proposition 2. SJ is a smooth manifold diﬀeomorphic to Ω(ω)×R(S−J)J. More-
over, as a ﬁber bundle over GJ,S, SJ ∼ = ε(H−1)+n ⊕ (H − 1)υ⊥.
In order to apply Lemma 4, let X = ∆H−1 × MJ × b Ω, and Y = SJ. Moreover,





where (for given L) σ is such that L ∈ Wσ, and Ω(σ) is deﬁned accordingly. Next,






where e = (e1,
 
eh
h≥2) is deﬁned as follows: for given b e ∈ b Ωσ, with σ such that









/σ(k,l) + (ψσ,k ◦ αJ)pσ
 
xh
σ − b eh
σ

































, andforh = 1
e1




where in the ﬁrst two lines expressions are evaluated at xh = xh(δ,µ), ∀h ≥ 2.
Observe that the ﬁrst two restrictions in (3.4), respectively, originate from the








h≥2. The last restriction in (3.4) is derived from the aggregate resource
constraint.
Remark 3. (The case of a symmetric equilibrium) In this section we have consid-
ered an economy in which the ﬁrst consumer is ﬁnancially unconstrained. It is well
known, at least since theorem 4.2 in Balasko and Cass (1989), that the equilibrium
manifold of such an economy, is diﬀeomorphic to the one that treats individuals
symmetrically. Just to sketch their argument, let us refer to these equilibrium set,
respectively, as SJ and SJ. First, consider a (P,L,e) in SJ, with an allocation x;
deﬁne p = ∇u1(x)P, then (p,L,e) ∈ SJ. In fact, at this new price vector the
28See the proof of Lemma 6 for a better understanding of how permutations of the rows of µ
are used to deﬁne a local coordinate system of the asset span L.16 MARIO TIRELLI
ﬁnancial constraint of agent 1 is trivially satisﬁed, and f1  
P,L,e1
= g1(p,e1).
Conversely, consider (p,L,e) ∈ SJ; ∇u1(x) = p holds at the equilibrium allocation,
x. Since p1zh
1 ∈ L for h ≥ 2, and markets clear; then, x1 ∈ f1  
p,L,e1
, i.e.
there exist Lagrange multipliers γ1 ∈ R
S−J
+ such that µ1 = γ1(I | ψσ(L))πσ, and
∇u1(x) = ρ1  
p,µ1
.
3.2.4. The ﬁber bundle structure of SJ. We are now going to deﬁne the ﬁber
bundle structure of SJ that we shall then use to characterize CPO equilibria in the
next section.
Deﬁnition 5. A ﬁber associated to (δ,µ) ∈ ∆H−1 × MJ is a set, Fδ,µ, of typical
element (p,L,e) ∈ P × GJ,S × Ω(ω): Fδ,µ is the inverse image of {δ,µ} × b Ω by τS.
Deﬁnition 5 is better understood by looking back at proposition 2. First, observe
that by propositions 1 and 2, SJ is homeomorphic to εn⊕TJ. This, loosely speaking,
implies that we can ﬁx no-trade equilibrium prices and allocations, and generate
an n -dimensional set of equilibria with active trade, in SJ. Precisely, recall that
τS : SJ → ∆H−1 × MJ × b Ω, associates to every equilibrium, (p,L,e) a unique
(δ,µ,b e), where b Ω ⊂ Rn, n ≡ (H − 1)(m − (S − J + 1)). Moreover, since each
(δ,µ) identiﬁes a no-trade equilibrium, through φT ,
 
τS−1
(δ,µ,b e) = (φT (δ,µ),b e).
This implies that
(3.5) Fδ,µ = (τS)−1({δ,µ} × b Ω)
Notice that a ﬁber associated to (δ,µ) contains those equilibria in SJ which i)
are compatible with a ﬁxed pair (p,L) and a ﬁxed equilibrium allocation (the cor-
responding no-trade equilibrium allocation), ii) have diﬀerent level of endowments
b e in b Ω, and thus of trades z.
Our ﬁbers have a few interesting properties, which are analogous to those estab-
lished for Walrasian equilibria in Balasko (1988), apply.
• Every ﬁber is a subset of SJ.
In fact, by deﬁnition,
 
τS−1
(δ,µ,b e) = (p,L,e) is an element of SJ.
• Every ﬁber is a linear submanifold of SJ, of dimension n.
This also follows by deﬁnition (equation (3.5)).
• Every ﬁber contains only one no-trade equilibrium.
This follows from the structure of no-trade, which are diﬀeomorphic to ∆H−1 ×
MJ (see proposition 1).
• Each equilibrium, (p,L,e) ∈ SJ, belongs to one ﬁber only.
This follows from deﬁnition 5: each ﬁber is identiﬁed by a unique no trade
equilibrium. This does also explain the following,
• Fibers can be “glued” together by letting (δ,µ) vary on ∆H−1 × MJ.
3.3. The structure of CPO equilibria. In this section we have worked with a
diﬀerent notion of the economy and equilibrium with respect to the real num´ eraire
one used in section 2. Hence something should be said about the constrained
Pareto optimality in this new setting. Indeed, we only need to adapt deﬁnition
3 as follows. For every economy (L,e), a consumption allocation x = (x0,x1) is
constrained feasible at (x0,e,L) if and only if it is,
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h ≥ 2,
(ii) supported by p1 as a, date 1, spot-market equilibrium at e e1 = e1 + z1.
Observe though, that because a change in the level of spot prices does not aﬀect
the spot-market equilibrium allocations, there are only as many as S(L−1) relevant
spot prices which can be controlled by the planner to achieve his objective. Hence,
without loss of generality, we assume that in the planner’s problem p1 is restricted
to ∆S(L−1) as it was for real num´ eraire assets in (2.2) above.
Next, to characterize CPO equilibria it is useful to directly appeal to our Plan-
ner’s problem. A necessary condition for an equilibrium to be CPO is that -ﬁber
by ﬁber- endowments are restricted such as to satisfy the ﬁrst order conditions for
a CPO.
For expositional simplicity, suppose that H − 1 > S(L − 1). Then, along a ﬁber
identiﬁed by (δ,µ), equilibria are CPO if endowments are restricted such as to keep P
h µheh
1 constant, say at cδ,µ ∈ RS(L−1). The appropriate constant, cδ,µ, may
vary depending of the asset structure considered. So, for example, in a GEI with real








sl (δ,µ) − Rsl for all (s,l) ≥ (1,2).29
These constancy requirements can be interpreted by saying that as e varies,
pinning down equilibria of a particular ﬁber, it should not induce any aggregate,
welfare, eﬀect (you may read our comments on (2.4) in section 2.2).
Our discussion implies the following.
• The set of CPO equilibria are contained in a linear submanifold of SJ of
codimension S(L − 1).
In fact, observe that for every ﬁber Fδ,µ we require that equilibria do also satisfy P
h µh
seh
1 = cδ,µ. The latter impose S(L − 1) linear restrictions on e. Moreover, by
the deﬁnition of ﬁbers, and the fact that each equilibrium belongs to a ﬁber only,
we ﬁnd that:
• Every CPO equilibrium belongs, at most, to one ﬁber.
Since the planner’s problem needs not be convex, there might be points on the
ﬁbers which are not CPO equilibria even if they satisfy the ﬁrst order conditions
for CPO.
We can now gather our ﬁndings to prove our main result.
Proof of Theorem 2:
The set of CPO equilibria is contained in ∪δ,µFδ,µ. 
Finally, one can exploit the ﬁber bundle structure of SJ to establish the, generic,
constrained ineﬃciency of equilibria. This comes as a straightforward application
of Sard’s theorem,30 implying that the set of economies with CPO-equilibria has
measure zero.
29For an arbitrary H, one has to explicitly account for DθP1: in a GEI with real num´ eraire
assets, one would require that -along a ﬁber (δ,µ)- as e varies,
P
h µh(xh
1 (δ,µ) − eh
1)DθP1 = 0
(i.e. condition (2.4) holds). The latter being necessary to achieve a CPO. Observe, however, that
DθP1, being a function of spot prices, depends on (δ,µ) only, and is therefore constant along each
ﬁber (δ,µ).
30See, for example, Guillemin and Pollack (1974), p. 205.18 MARIO TIRELLI
3.4. Economies and equilibria with real assets. For completeness, we are now
going to show how our construction can be used to study the eﬃciency properties
of a GEI with real assets.
A real asset GEI is parametrized by (e,R) on Ω × RSLJ, with R denoting the
real payoﬀ matrix. When restricted to P×GJ,S ×RSLJ, the set of ﬁnancial market
possibilities of this economy is,
MJ = {(p,L,e,R) : (I | ψσ(L))πσV (p1R) = 0,σ ∈ Σ s.t.L ∈ Wσ}
where V (p1R) is the S × J asset matrix, of typical element psRj
s. Then, the set of
pseudo equilibria in this economy is deﬁned by
EJ = {(p,L,e,R) : Z(p,L,e) = 0,(p,L,R) ∈ MJ)}.
Lemma 7. MJ is a manifold diﬀeomorphic to P × RSJL. Moreover as a ﬁber
bundle over GJ,S, MJ ∼ = εNL−1+SJ(L−1) ⊕ Jυ.
Proof: see the Appendix.
The next proposition directly follows by Proposition 2 and Lemma 7.
Proposition 3. For all 0 < J < S, the set of equilibria EJ is diﬀeomorphic to
Ω(ω)×RSJL. Moreover, over GJ,S, it has a ﬁber bundle structure, EJ ∼ = SJ ⊕MJ.
Finally, denoting by Es the Walrasian equilibrium manifold in the state s econ-
omy, and by E the Walrasian equilibrium manifold of an economy with a complete
set of contingent markets, we have the following.
Remark 4. Similarly to SJ the following consideration apply.
1) If markets are “totally” incomplete, J = 0, the set of equilibria is the Cartesian
product of the set of the S + 1 spot-market equilibria, E0 = ×S
s=0Es.
2) When markets are complete, J = S, the set of equilibria is equivalent to the set
of Walrasian equilibria, ES = E.
In any intermediate case, 0 < J < S, EJ has the (non-trivial) structure derived in
proposition 3.
Appendix
Proofs of Section 2
. Proof of lemma 2 (sketch): Let U0 ⊂ U ⊂ R be the set containing utility func-
tion of h that admit local quadratic perturbations: a utility that admits qua-







s − xs), where for all s > 0, Bh
s ∈ RL×L is a symmetric matrix, ε > 0 is
small enough such as to ensure that uh preserves strict-concavity, ρ : Rm
+ → [0,1]
is a Cr≥2 (bump31) function, with compact support over Rm
++, taking value 1 in a
neighborhood of x, and 0 otherwise, for all s. Thus, at a point x, we take uh to
be deﬁned on Rm
++ × [0,1] × B where B ⊂ Rm×m is the set of symmetric matri-
ces. It is easily shown that for every convergence sequence of matrices Bh
n → Bh,
uh(·;·,Bh
n) → uh(·;·,Bh) in the Cr≥2 topology of uniform convergence.
Next, for ﬁxed (P1,m1) such that Dmh
s e xh
s are well deﬁned, let the mapping
Gh
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where C = RL
++ ×R+ is the set of the endogenous variables in the individual prob-
lem, (xh
s,λh
s), for all s. We are going to show that there exists an open and dense








s) = 0, all s. Observe that by adjoining the L marginal propensities equa-
tions to each spot -demand ﬁrst order conditions, we have added equations without
adding unknowns. Thus, to prove our result it suﬃces to show that we can (lo-
cally) control Dmh
s e xh
s independently from fh
s , and Dmh
s e x1
s. This is done by perturb-
ing the utility function of h with respect to Bh








for all s (i.e. we want to make x a function of (P1,m1)). In doing so we ex-
ploit the fact that there exists an open neighborhood of x such that the following
three properties hold: uh(xh;ε,Bh,x) = uh(xh), Duh(xh;ε,Bh,x) = Duh(xh),
D2uh(xh;ε,Bh,x) = D2uh(xh) + εBh. So that the perturbation adopted neither
changes the utility level nor its gradient, leaving unaﬀected the ﬁrst order condi-
tions for an individual optimum. Finally, to argue that U∗ is also open, we simply
observe that the property that (3.6) has independent rows is open. 
Proof of Lemma 3: Since (e,u) ∈ Ω0 ×U∗, DθP1 is well deﬁned, and Dθh
j P1 6= 0
for some (h,j) ≥ (2,1), when it is evaluated at equilibrium. Fix u ∈ U∗, and deﬁne
Ω00 the subset of Ω0 such that for every e ∈ Ω00, there exists a regular equilibrium  
P,q,e















j P1 = 0
o
is closed in Ω00. Hence, Ω0
hj = Ω00\Ωhj is relatively open. We are now going to show
that Ω0
hj is also dense in Ω00. Since e ∈ Ωhj is a regular economy, then there exists an















= 0. To see the latter, it suﬃces to show that there exists a
marginal perturbation of endowments such as to change spot trades, z, without
aﬀecting consumption allocations and prices. Let this perturbation be ∆eh
1 ∈ RLS
(for some h 6= 1 such that Dθh
j P1 6= 0) satisfy: i) p1∆eh
1 = R∆θh for some




1. Further, let ¯ eh
1 = eh
1 + ∆eh
1, and take zh
1 =
xh
1 − ¯ eh
1 = zh
1 − ∆eh


















satisﬁes market clearing in the new economy, ¯ e.
Moreover, observe that also Dθh
j P1 is not aﬀected by the above perturbation of
endowments (and the resulting changes in m1), since it only depends on x,P (see
(2.7), (2.8)). Finally, Ω∗ = ∩h,jΩ0
hj = Ω00\ ∩h,j Ωhj, is open and of full Lebesgue
measure in Ω(ω). 
Proofs of Section 3
. Proof of Lemma 5: The fact that MJ is a manifold follows directly from being



























= 0 (i.e. µ
0
J = 0). The latest











J = µJ − µ/Jµ
−1
/J µJ = 0. Finally, codim(MJ) = c◦, and thus dim(MJ) =
c∗ = (H − 1)S −c◦ = (H − 1 + J)(S − J), exactly a number of coordinates equal
to the elements of µ/J,µJ,µ/J.32 
Let A be the (S − J)J matrix representing the unique local coordinate sys-
tem of L and of its orthogonal L⊥. Further, denote by σ a permutation map-
ping from {1,..,S} onto itself, by Σ the set of all such permutations, and by
πσ the (S × S) permutation matrix associated to σ. For every σ ∈ Σ, Wσ = 






. {Wσ : σ ∈ Σ} is an open
cover of GJ,S, GJ,S ⊂ ∪σ∈ΣWσ. Finally, we deﬁne ψσ : Wσ → RJ(S−J) such that
ψσ(L) = A. This map is a homeomorphism of Wσ onto RJ(S−J).
Proof of Lemma 6: (MJ,GJ,S,αJ) is a ﬁber bundle. Moreover, by lemma 5, for
every µ ∈ MJ there exist open neighborhoods Vµ ⊂ R(H−1)S and O ⊂ Rc
∗
, and
a smooth homeomorphism h : O → Vµ. (O,Vµ,h) is a local parametrization of
MJ about µ. Moreover h−1 : Vµ → O deﬁnes a local coordinate system for every
µ ∈ Vµ. We now derive h.




πσ = µ, where Γ is







. Thus, γh  
IS−J | A

πσ = µh ∈ L⊥, for all h ≥ 2 (i.e.  
..,1 + µh,..

∈ (H − 1)υ⊥), where A = ψσ(L) is the local coordinate system
of L. Therefore, each µ ∈ Imh(γ,L;σ) is an element of MJ.33 Since (γ,A) ∈ Rc
∗
,
and c∗ is equal to the dimension of MJ, h is a, continuous, injection.
Next, let us deﬁne the inverse mapping h−1. for every µ ∈ Vµ, we can ﬁnd a local








σ0 (A) = L = αJ (µ)
for some σ0 ∈ Σ. More precisely, since µ in MJ has rank S −J, we can always ﬁnd






32Notice that since µJ is determined when µ/J,µJ,µ/J are given, the latter three matrices
deﬁnes a local parametrization of MJ of dimension (H − 1)S − #µJ = (H − 1 + J)(S − J).
33The fact that MJ does not have a vector space structure emerges clearer at this point: loosely
speaking, the two set of local coordinates, (γ,A), are ”interdependent”.CONSTRAINED INEFFICIENCY IN GEI: A GEOMETRIC ARGUMENT 21




, induces a sub-































Therefore, L = αJ(µ) = ψσ0((µ/J)−1µ/J), and A = (µ/J)−1µ/J deﬁnes its coordi-







h−1; a continuous mapping.




→ GJ,S × R(H−1)(S−J)
αJ= ρ ◦ h & . ρ(naturalproj.)
GJ,S
Finally, being a smooth manifold, MJ has a local vector space structure (on ﬁbers),
and h is a diﬀeomorphism. Yet, MJ is not a trivial vector bundle. This is imme-
diately seen once it is noticed that the latter characterization represents MJ as a
(H − 1) copy of υ⊥. 
























= λh (p0,p1) +
 






= 0,∀h ≥ 2





= 0,∀h ≥ 2
where L is taken to be an element of Wσ.
Proof of proposition 1:
• Let us start with τ. When τT is restricted to SJ, x are equilibrium al-
locations, and δh = D01u1(x)/D01uh(x) ∈ R++, for all h ≥ 2. To show
that µ ∈ MJ, observe that xh ∈ fh(p,L,e), by individual ﬁrst order con-
ditions, implies that there exists a γh ∈ RS−J/{0} such that ∇1uh(x) =
(1S + γh (IS−J | ψσ(L))p1. By deﬁnition of τT , µh = γh (IS−J | ψσ(L)).
Finally, assuming that SJ is a smooth manifold, and observing that τT has
smooth coordinates, we conclude that τT is smooth.
• Next, consider φ. To show that φT is well deﬁned, and smooth, it suﬃces to
prove that the set of solutions to (3.3) (call it K), is -respectively- nonempty
and its elements, x(δ,µ), are smooth functions on RH−1 × MJ. Nonempti-
ness follows from the fact that (3.3) is the maximization of a continuous









is such that the ﬁrst (S − J) vectors are





σ, for all h0 = S − J + 1,..,H − 1.22 MARIO TIRELLI
(δ,µ) ∈ RH−1 × MJ, there is a unique solution. We establish that x(δ,µ)
is smooth in lemma 8, below.
• We then argue that the image of φT is TJ.
: ImφT ⊂ TJ. Consider the ﬁrst order (necessary and suﬃcient) conditions












= ρ1(µh,p1) = ((1 + µh
s)ps)s≥1
where p ∈ Rm
++ is the vector of Lagrange multipliers of the resource con-
straints; and markets clear, x(δ,µ) ∈ Ω(ω). Notice that p = ∇u1(x1(δ,µ)) =
1




, agents optimize; i.e. individual ﬁrst order conditions
in (3.8), (3.9) hold, respectively, for h = 1 and all h ≥ 2. With some
















= b γh (I | ψσ (L))πσp1
where b γh = 1
λhγh, for all h ≥ 2. Clearly, (λh)−1 = δh for all h ≥ 2, and
λ1 = D01u1  
x1(δ,µ)

. Second, as we argued in section 3.2.1, we use the
fact that given a µ ∈ MJ, and a permutation σ0 ∈ Σ, we can univocally
recover a matrix Γ ∈ R(H−1)×(S−J) of typical element-vector b γh, and a L






L = αJ(µ) = ψσ0((µ/J)−1µ/J), and A = (µ/J)−1µ/J is the coordinate







: ImφT ⊃ TJ. Let us show that φT ◦τT = idTJ when τT is restricted to TJ. If
(p,L,e) ∈ SJ, and the equilibrium allocation is x = e, then individual ﬁrst
order conditions, (3.11), hold at e, and so do (3.10) at (δ,µ) = τ(p,L,e);
because
P
h eh = ω, e is a solution to (3.3) at (δ,µ) = τ(p,L,e).
• By Lemma 4, φT deﬁnes the desired diﬀeomorphism, and when τT is re-
stricted to TJ, τT ◦ φT = idR
H−1
++ ×MJ.
• Finally, the ﬁber bundle structure of TJ follows immediately from the struc-
ture of MJ. 
Lemma 8. x(δ,µ) is a smooth function on MJ × ∆H−1
Proof:
First, in analogy with a Pareto maximum problem, every solution of (3.3) is
interior. Then, ﬁrst order (necessary and suﬃcient) conditions of (3.3) are,
1 χh
sDslUh
s (xh) − DslU1




sl − ω = 0, s ≥ 0,l ≥ 1,
We denote this system as F(x;χ,ω) = 0. Since K = ImF−1 (0), 0 is a regular
35For the full argument, see the deﬁnition of the mapping h(γ,L;σ) in the proof of Lemma 6.CONSTRAINED INEFFICIENCY IN GEI: A GEOMETRIC ARGUMENT 23
value of F if its Jacobian, DxF, is of full rank. Since uh are Cr≥2, F and x(δ,µ)












Im Im Im Im
Since column operations do not aﬀect the rank of (3.12), subtract the ﬁrst column
block from the hth, for h = 2,..,H; then, move the resulting Hth row block (a
block–row vector of typical element Im in the ﬁrst H blocks) to the top row block.












































s ∈ RL×L. We are going to show that O is of full rank, because otherwise
negative deﬁniteness of D2uh (in assumption 2) would be contradicted. For r1 ∈












Post multiplying the latter by r1
T


































By assumption 2), the two terms in the latter expression are negative, and so is
their sum. Hence, (3.14) is equal to zero if and only if r1
s,h = 0, for all s and all
h ≥ 2. Finally, observe that MJ × ∆H−1 ⊂ R(H−1)(S+1). 
Proof of Proposition 2:
Observe that the endowments restrictions in (3.4) imply that ImφS ⊂ SJ.
ImφS ⊃ SJ, follows from observing that φS ◦ τS = idS. φS,τS are smooth func-
tions, since their coordinates are smooth. Therefore, SJ = φS(∆H−1 ×MJ × b Ω), is
a smooth manifold. 24 MARIO TIRELLI
Proof of Lemma 7:36 We proceed by showing that MJ and εNL−1+SJ(L−1)⊕Jυ
are homeomorphic. Then, since the latter is a vector bundle, it has a vector space
structure on ﬁbers (over GJ,S); therefore for MJ to be a manifold of dimension
(NL − 1)+SJL = (NL − 1)+(S − J)J+J2+SJ(L−1), we need to show that such
an homeomorphic is in fact a diﬀeomorphism (i.e. it is smooth and has a smooth
inverse). To deﬁne the desired homeomorphism, let r = (r(1),r(−1)) ∈ RSLJ



















is an element of the J-copy of the canonical vector bundle υ, Jυ,












= (p,L,R) is de-
ﬁned such that R is formed by r = (r(1),r(−1)) with
rj












for all (s,j) ≥ (1,1).
Thus, φM is an homeomorphism between MJ and εNL−1+SJ(L−1) ⊕ Jυ, with its
inverse, φM
−1
= τM. Finally, to show that φM is also a diﬀeomorphism it suﬃces
to show 0 is a regular value of (I | ψσ(L))πσV (p1R), or that its Jacobian with
respect to R is of full row rank (S − J)J (as in Fact 7, Duﬃe and Shafer (1985)).
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